A river is not just a stream of water; it is the heartbeat of a nation. Throughout the history of river-based civilizations, the land of Bangladesh has sustained its life on the flow of rivers and their rhythm. But when the flow of these rivers is obstructed upstream, the country struggles to breathe, the lands of marginal farmers dry up, and distrust begins to flood the diplomacy between the two neighbors. The relationship between Bangladesh and India over water has often been filled with friendly assurances, but at times, it is as dry as a parched field in drought. The history embedded in this relationship is heavy, and the current pressures are intense. The 54 common rivers between the two countries serve as a vital link, but in reality, the cooperation remains largely fragmented. The river-based relationship between India and Bangladesh began in the mid-20th century, centered around the distribution of the Ganges waters. The Ganges, which witnessed the diplomatic tensions caused by India's unilateral Farakka Barrage in 1975, was temporarily resolved through a treaty in 1996 but the issue was far from over. In fact, questions surrounding the distribution of water for rivers like Teesta, Tipaimukh, Mohuri, Feni, Monu, and Dharla remain unresolved and await a fair share for Bangladesh. Teesta, in particular, evokes deep regret in the minds of Bangladeshis. Nearly a decade ago, a draft agreement on water sharing for the Teesta was finalized, but it was never implemented due to internal political objections within India and the West Bengal government's opposition. The Teesta agreement is crucial for Bangladesh, as the water flow in the river drops significantly in the dry season, threatening the irrigation-dependent agriculture of the Rangpur region. Given that 93% of the rivers' upstream flows are in India, each move of India's water policy directly impacts Bangladesh's environment, economy, and the lives of its people. When India constructs dams like Farakka, Tipaimukh, or Gajoldoba, Bangladesh faces the long-term crisis of dwindling river flows, reduced water supply, and even issues of waterlogging or salinity. This crisis is not merely environmental; it reflects the failures of political, diplomatic, and technological strategies. The Joint River Commission (JRC), formed in 1972, is still limited to data collection and sporadic meetings. Transparency, joint environmental impact assessments, and collaborative research are lacking. Instead, many activities related to the river's course and water withdrawal are conducted unilaterally by India, gradually leading to disputes, misunderstandings, and a reduction in trust between the two countries. The water-sharing issue has reached such an uncertain stage that resolving it within a bilateral framework now seems impossible. Had a solution been possible through bilateral negotiations, the water issues between India and Bangladesh would have been resolved by now, and the people on both sides of the border could have enjoyed better living standards. Therefore, considering the current context, there is a need for multilateral dialogue, where platforms like BIMSTEC, SAARC, or UNESCAP could play an active role. International organizations like the World Bank or UN Water could assist in the management of common rivers by providing support in data analysis, forecasting, and project implementation. Moreover, new diplomatic concepts, such as the "Water for Transit" policy, can be explored. This policy suggests that Bangladesh could ask for a fair share of water in exchange for offering India commercial transit facilities. Strategic diplomatic thinking would be necessary for such negotiation, which would not only involve formal meetings but would be built on a multifaceted framework of transactions. Additionally, India and Bangladesh could increase cooperation in river-based economic activities such as joint hydroelectric projects, waterway development, river tourism, and fish farming. These areas of partnership could transform rivers from being a source of dispute into a shared resource. For this, it is necessary to recognize rivers as "living entities," a status already granted by India to the Ganges and Yamuna rivers. If India and Bangladesh jointly recognize the common rivers as such, the responsibility and accountability in water management will increase for both countries. Simultaneously, ensuring the participation of local communities is urgent. The people living along the riverbanks, who have always been excluded from diplomatic discussions, are the ones most affected by the water crisis. Their lives, agriculture, and livelihoods are intricately connected to the rivers. Therefore, without participatory water management, no long-term solution will be possible. Water is not just a natural resource; it is the lifeline of civilization. It is also the tool for preserving the existence of future generations. Thus, we must view the resolution of this crisis as a moral duty to future generations. The decisions made today will determine how South Asia ensures water security in the future. Solving the water crisis is not only about technology or treaties; it is a question of humanitarian perspective. Rivers never create boundaries; they build bridges of mutual relationship. India and Bangladesh must strengthen this bridge and take integrated steps to improve the lives of people on both sides of the border. To this end, establishing sustainable and fair water policies could be the best approach. We must ensure that the resource provided by nature continues through cooperation, not division, and only then will the river thrive and the relationship between the two countries become stronger.